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Resolving the Inconsistency between National and EU Motor Insurance 
Law. Was Factortame the Solution nobody Sought? 
 
Abstract 
 
In this article we argue that the continued uncertainty of UK national motor vehicle insurance 
law when viewed in respect of its EU parent, the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directive (MVID), 
has not been satisfactorily addressed using the remedy available through the non-contractual 
liability of the State. The existing enforcement mechanisms have equally been haphazard in 
their effectiveness and success in affording rights to third-party victims. Given the link 
between the MVID and the free movement of persons and goods on which the harmonization 
of insurance protection was based, we present the first article establishing an argument for the 
offending aspects of UK national law to be disapplied. Whilst the UK has concluded its 
agreement to withdraw its membership from the EU and thus to be bound by EU law and the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, until the transitional period is completed the UK 
remains aligned to EU law. It is committed to follow superior EU law and the judgments of 
the Court of Justice. Hence the remedy issued from the Factortame line of case authorities 
may prove to be the most effective way to grant access to rights which continue to be denied 
to victims in the UK. 
 
KEYWORDS: Breach of EU law; Factortame; Francovich v Italy; HS2; motor vehicles; 
MVID.     
 
A. Introduction 
 
As is well understood, the European Union, in its present and previous incarnations, was 
designed to facilitate a common market between its Member States (similar to a domestic 
market). One of the essential conditions to bring this to fruition was the establishment of free 
movement of goods and of persons, and key to this aim was to create a minimum standard of 
compulsory motor vehicle insurance. Such a system of compulsory insurance cover against 
civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles would protect the interests of victims of 
accidents and remove disparities of legal protection between the States. Hence, by 
establishing a system of compulsory motor vehicle insurance between Member States, 
individuals and other motorists would be free to travel throughout the EU knowing that 
minimum standards of cover would be in place to compensate the third-party victims of 
accidents involving motor vehicles. This was achieved, first, through the Motor Vehicle 
Insurance Directive (MVID) of 1972
1
 and then a subsequent series of MVID
2
 which 
expanded the protection of third-party victims and requiring Member States to establish a 
national compensatory body to provide a remedy to this class of victim in the event that they 
had no insurer from which to recover damages.
3
 In the UK this body, established many years 
prior to the MVID’s creation, is the Motor Insurers’ Bureau4 (MIB) and it is a requirement 
for every insurer operating in the UK to be a member of the MIB. Indeed, a percentage from 
                                                 
1
 (The First Directive) Council Directive 72/166/EEC [1972] OJ L103/1. 
2
 (The First Directive) Council Directive 72/166/EEC [1972] OJ L103/1; (The) Second Council Directive 
84/5/EEC [1984] OJ LL8/17; (The) Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC [1990] OJ L129/33; Directive 
2000/26/EC (The Fourth Motor Insurance Directive) [2000] OJ L181/65; (The Fifth Directive) Directive 
2005/14/EC [2005] OJ L149/14; and (The Sixth Directive) Directive 2009/103/EC [2009] OJ L263/11. 
3
 Established in the Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC [1984] OJ LL8/17. 
4
 Of course, similar organisations exist in each Member State. 
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every motor insurance premium paid in the UK is taken by the MIB to fund this 
compensatory scheme. 
 
Due to the nature of the requirement to protect victims in the event of no insurer being 
available to provide damages, the MIB entered into a series of agreements with the Secretary 
of State (the UK government). These agreements were titled the Uninsured Drivers’ 
Agreement (to be used where the driver had no insurance policy in place at the time of the 
accident or where the insurer used a provision within an existing contract to avoid its 
responsibilities) and the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement (for events where the vehicle causing 
the accident could not be traced – for example with so called “hit and run” incidents). The 
national legislation in place, the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA88) along with the extra-
statutory Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement (UDA) and the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 
(UtDA) operate to give effect to the MVID and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. 
 
Perhaps one of the more controversial aspects of the literature, commentary and judicial 
examination of national motor vehicle insurance law has been the discussion surrounding the 
enforcement of the MVID in the UK.
5
 It has been a consistent source of uncertainty, 
however, due to the general disregard of the law nationally, it has also led to successes where 
third party victims of motor vehicle accidents have obtained judgments against the State 
under a Francovich
6
 action. Indirect effect has also been a doctrine receptive of some courts, 
although the distinction between a Marleasing
7
 approach and that required in Pfeiffer,
8
 which 
expands the duty of purposive interpretation,
9
 seems to have been underutilised nationally. 
                                                 
5
 As just an example of the critical writing in this area see Nicholas Bevan writing for the NEW LAW 
JOURNAL which includes: Motor Insurance Law Change 166 NLJ 7703, 5 (2016); Putting Wrongs to Rights 
(Pt 2) 166 NLJ 7701, 13 (2016); Putting Wrongs to Rights (Pt 1) 166 NLJ 7700, 17 (2016); Redress Road 166 
NLJ 7700, 5 (2016); Still Driving Dangerously 166 NLJ 7693, 18 (2016); A Call for (More) Reform 165 NLJ 
7661, 9 (2015); No Through Road 165 NLJ 7648, 7 (2015); Delaney Sets a New Insurance Route 165 NLJ 
7644, 4 (2015); High Impact 164 NLJ 7628, 5 (2014); Ignore at Your Peril 164 NLJ 7628, 7 (2014); Bad Law 
164 NLJ 7624, 7 (2014); UK in Breach Over Uninsured Drivers 164 NLJ 7610, 4 (2014); Untraced Drivers’ 
Scheme is Car Crash 164 NLJ 7598, 4 (2014); On the Right Road (Pt IV)163 NLJ 193 (2013); On the Right 
Road? (Pt III) 163 NLJ 160 (2013); On the Right Road? (Pt II) 163 NLJ 130 (2013); On the Right Road? 163 
NLJ 94 (2013); Asleep at the Wheel? 163 NLJ 7556, 10 (2013). James Marson and Katy Ferris have published 
the following Too Little, Too Late? Brexit Day, Transitional Periods and the Implications of MIB v Lewis 
EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW (in press) (2020); The Compatibility of English Law with the Motor Vehicle 
Insurance Directives: The Courts Giveth… But will Brexit Taketh Away 136 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW. 
35-40 (2020); For the Want of Certainty: Vnuk, Juliana and Andrade and the Obligation to Insure 82(6) 
MODERN LAW REVIEW. 1132-1145 (2019); Brexit means Brexit: What does it mean for the Protection of 
Third Party Victims and the Road Traffic Act? STATUTE LAW REVIEW, 39 (2), 211-27 (2018); Motor 
Vehicle Insurance Law: Ignoring the Lessons from King Rex 38(5) BUSINESS LAW REVIEW, 178-186 
(2017); Misunderstanding and Misapplication of Motor Insurance Law. Will the Supreme Court come to the 
Rescue? 23 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (2) (2017); The Uninsured Drivers’ 
Agreement 2015 as a Legitimate Source of Authority 38(2) STATUTE LAW REVIEW, 133-146 (2017); 
Delaney and the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives: lessons for the teaching of EU law 50 LAW TEACHER, 
1-17 (2017); Which is the Applicable Law in Recovery of Losses from an Uninsured Driver? Moreno v The 
Motor Insurers’ Bureau [2016] UKSC 52 22 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, (3) 
(2016); and, with Alex Nicholson, Irreconcilable Differences? The Road Traffic Act and the European Motor 
Vehicle Insurance Directives THE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW, 1, 51-70 (2017). 
6
 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci and others v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 
7
 Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135. 
8
 Bernhard Pfeiffer et alia v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Walshut eV [2004] ECR 1-8835. 
9
 “when the national court is seised of a dispute concerning the application of domestic provisions which, as 
here, have been specifically enacted for the purpose of transposing a directive intended to confer rights on 
individuals. The national court must… presume that the Member State, following its exercise of the discretion 
afforded it under that provision, had the intention of fulfilling entirely the obligations arising from the directive 
concerned.” 
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Most recently, in MIB v Lewis,
10
 the Court of Appeal confirmed that aspects of the MVID 
have direct effect and the MIB is an emanation of the State. This ruling has broadened the 
opportunity for those directly effective aspects of the MVID to be given effect in national 
courts. Collectively, each of the above mechanisms for the enforcement of EU law or in 
providing a financial remedy to the victim have been rather limited in practical terms, 
frequently because of the opaqueness of the remedies and, as Marson and Ferris11 explain, the 
teaching of EU law principles often fail to instil in future lawyers and judges the muscle-
memory of assessing, comparatively, EU laws and their national transposing measures. 
Whilst not an enforcement mechanism, as it forms part of a body of rules which enables 
affected individuals to seek redress from the State for damages or loss caused by its breach of 
EU law, “state liability” is a mechanism which has been available as a source of redress for 
third-party victims. The doctrine of state liability, established in Francovich,12 will be 
remembered as a means for affected individuals to recover damages, yet even with some 
notable successes in the area of motor vehicle insurance,
13
 using it to compel Member States 
to adhere to their EU legal responsibilities has seen limited success. Indeed, it can also be 
stated with a degree of certainty that over many years, and until relatively recently by the 
Court of Appeal14 and Ward LJ in particular on frequent occasions, that the courts have been 
reluctant to find the UK in breach of the MVID. This was notably demonstrated in the failed 
judicial review of the law started by the charity Roadpeace.15 The cases demonstrate the need 
for fresh thinking around granting third-party victims of motor vehicle accidents access to 
their EU rights in light of a recalcitrant UK. 
 
In addressing the instances of the UK breaching its obligations under the MVID, the 
problems inherent in the available enforcement mechanisms and the limitations in actions 
under state liability, an argument is presented for the inconsistent national laws in motor 
vehicle insurance to be disapplied. Thus, Factortame
16
 as a model for the halting of the 
application of laws in breach of the MVID may ensure compliance with superior EU law in a 
way that has been hitherto impossible to achieve. As far as the authors are aware, at present 
there have been no arguments presented on this basis and in light of the dicta in the Supreme 
Court judgment in R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport,17 an 
argument is presented that national courts not only can, but have a legal duty to strike down 
aspects of an Act of Parliament that does not comply with EU law.
18
 Whilst it is accepted that 
Factortame
19
 was based on a Treaty Article and not an EU Directive, the MVID have their 
origin as giving effect to fundamental principles of the free movement of goods and of 
                                                 
10
 MIB v Lewis [2019] EWCA Civ 909; [2019] 6 WLUK 26. 
11
 James Marson & Katy Ferris, Delaney and the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives: lessons for the teaching 
of EU law, 51 THE LAW TEACHER 411–427 (2016). 
12
 Cases C-6/90 and 9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Republic of Italy [1991] I-5357. It ruled that it is a principle 
of Community law, inherent in the system of the EC Treaty, “that the Member States are obliged to make good 
loss and damage caused to individuals by breaches of Community law for which they can be held responsible.” 
13
 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2015] EWCA Civ 172 and EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership 
[2012] EWCA Civ 1267. 
14
 Bristol Alliance Ltd Partnership v Williams [2012] EWCA Civ 1267 and Sahin v Havard [2016] EWCA Civ 
1202. 
15
 RoadPeace v Secretary of State for Transport and Motor Insurers' Bureau [2017] EWHC 2725. 
16
 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603. 
17
 R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3. 
18
 Jay J. Arangones, Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport Ex Parte Factortame Ltd.: The Limits of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Rule of Community Law 14(3) FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL 778-818 (1990). 
19
 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci and others v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 
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people. However, by extension, in HS2
20
 it was possible to argue (albeit by the judiciary in a 
hypothetical setting)
21
 that EU Directive 2011/92/EU should prevent the application of 
inconsistent national law relating to decision-making – in this case that concerning the 
construction of a new highspeed railway. Thus, in relation to the Treaty provisions of free 
movement of people and goods (Factortame)
22
 and the adherence of national laws and 
administrative provisions to comply with an EU Directive (HS2)
23
 the argument presented 
here may be more persuasive and result in a paradigm-shift in enforcement of EU motor 
vehicle insurance law in the UK. At least whilst the UK remains a Member State.
24
 
 
B. The Free Movement Principle and Motor Vehicle Insurance… 
 
The Free movement of EU citizens within the Community can be traced to the establishment 
of the European Economic Community in 1957,
25
 being later developed under the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1992. However, EU citizens’ right to move and reside in other EU States with, 
to some extent, no restriction had not been achieved at this stage but required the passing of 
Directive 2004/38/EC
26
 to give effect to this Treaty principle. The ultimate aim of the Treaty, 
and given effect via the enactment of secondary law, was to establish a Community where 
EU citizens can live, travel and move freely with as few restrictions as possible. It was borne 
of anti-discrimination and sought to harmonize rules through the Community to facilitate free 
movement of persons and goods. 
 
Free movement of EU citizens is a fundamental principle of the Treaty enshrined in Articles 
21 and 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as well as Article 
3(2) of the Treaty on European Union. Article 45 of the TFEU states clearly that “Freedom 
of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community.” It is a treaty requirement, 
which has direct effect on national courts of EU Member States without the need for further 
legislation for implementation. Therefore, and in order for national States to secure freedom 
of movement as required under the Treaty, States need to ensure that people are fully 
protected when moving from one State to another. In other words, EU individuals shall not 
face any obstacles that restrict their rights of movement such as facing different levels of 
insurance cover and protections that may undermine their rights when they become victims of 
incidents involving motor vehicles simply because they have crossed borders within the 
Community. Any such restriction would be interpreted as a breach of the Treaty and requires 
correction. Furthermore, the EU, in the First MVID,
27
 aimed from the outset to “liberalise the 
rules regarding the movement of persons and motor vehicles travelling between Member 
States.”28 Therefore, EU Member States such as the UK, which have been in breach of these 
requirements should correct the wrong and bring its national law into compliance with the 
                                                 
20
 Supra note 17. 
21
 Id. as explained at paras. 93 and 94. 
22
 Supra note 12.  
23
 Supra note 17.  
24
 According to the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, the UK’s transitional period and 
continued relationship with the EU will cease on the 31 December 2020 and the Act will enter into force. 
25
 Provisions 1(1), 1(2), 1(5) and 2(1)(4). 
26
 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 
73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC. 
27
 First Council Directive 72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972 on the approximation of the laws of Member States 
relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement of the 
obligation to insure against such liability. 
28
 Preamble to the Directive. 
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MVID. This ensures the requirement of minimum standards of insurance are met for those 
travelling throughout the EU, and it ensures that cross-border travel is harmonized to the 
extent that no hinderance to people and vehicles is experienced when moving from one State 
to another.   
 
C. … And its Significance to the Community 
 
Free movement of people is one of the four founding principles upon which the EU is based. 
Article 3 of the Treaty of Lisbon provides that “The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its 
values and the well-being of its peoples... and shall promote social justice and protection.” 
From this it is derived that free movement is a fundamental principle of the Community that 
cannot be achieved without social justice and protection. The EU’s values which include 
“equality and the rule of law” cannot be achieved by, for instance, having different treatment 
for victims of uninsured or untraced drivers in comparison to claims made directly to insurers 
just because the driver at fault was uninsured or the vehicle unidentified.
29
 Furthermore, it 
breaches citizens’ rights to have their rights protected as it undermines other EU values (the 
rule of law) when the UK’s motor insurance law30 breaches the MVID.  
 
One of the drawbacks of the First MVID was the disparity in legal protection afforded third-
party victims between Member States, which was deemed a substantial barrier to free 
movement. This was especially in respect of the scope of insurance cover and the exclusion 
clauses to the responsibilities of insurers permitted by each State.
31
 This undermined the 
effectiveness of free movement. It entailed a Second Directive
32
 to be passed to remedy these 
drawbacks. The UK, however, was reluctant to remove these existing obstacles that were 
leading to the disparities in respect of the scope and exclusion clauses permitted within its 
national law. Whilst the RTA 1930 was the basis on which the First MVID was founded, it 
was clear that while the EU, since 1983, was attempting to develop the law to avoid the 
negative consequences experienced by third-party victims of accidents involving motor 
vehicles, the UK, and its close relationship with the national motor vehicle insurance 
industry, was reluctant to adopt the changes required of it. For the EU, the consequence of 
failing to facilitate free movement would be to undermine the aims of the Community which 
included facilitating tolerance across the Community, to build trust and to deepen integration 
between the different cultures within the EU. Therefore, and to ensure the protective purposes 
of the MVID was not undermined by national laws, the law required amendment to facilitate 
compliance. In the UK, the RTA88, and the MIB Agreements, in many respects do not 
comply with the aims of the MVID to provide the precise levels of protection and thereby 
facilitating the free movements of people, goods and (therein vehicles) in the Community.  
                                                 
29
 Equality and the rule of law cannot be achieved too if citizens of one Community face different legal systems 
based on where an incident takes place. 
30
 Throughout this article the terms “UK national law” or “UK law” will be used. This is for simplicity to draw 
attention to the difference between this law (namely the laws of England and Wales) and those at the EU level. 
31
 Compare, for example the extent to the permissible exclusions of liability, still in existence in s. 148 RTA88, 
and which have been subject to academic scrutiny and condemnation whilst the Court of Justice, in Finanger v 
Norway (National Association for Road Traffic Victims, intervening) [2006] 3 CMLR 13, stated  “The Motor 
Vehicle Insurance Directives do not grant national authorities a margin of political or economic discretion with 
regard to the requirement of insurance… The purpose was to pave the way for a Common Market with free 
movement, and one of the means was to achieve security for the survivors of road traffic accidents... The 
development from the first to the third Directive shows that a strong degree of protection was intended, so that 
the various exemption rules that existed in certain countries were forbidden.” 
32
 (The) Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [1984] OJ LL8/17.  
 6 
 
D. But Should the UK’s Motor Insurance Law Be Disapplied? The Offending 
Provisions Apt for Disapplication 
 
In both Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport
33
 and EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership
34
 
not only were national appeal courts confused as to the requirements of UK national law in 
relation to their EU parent, but the cases were also notable for the claimant successfully 
obtaining redress from the State in a Francovich
35
 action. However, when one considers the 
scale of the errors present in the rulings by the courts in the UK as to the compatibility of 
national legislation with the MVID, these add weight to the argument for the necessity of a 
disapplication of the offending laws. The article continues the discussion by, briefly, 
identifying the most egregious breaches of EU law and those areas which require disapplying 
in the RTA88, the UDA 2015 and the UtDA 2017. This is not an exhaustive list, but simply 
used to represent the most obvious and serious breaches of EU law which affect the rights of 
third-party victims. Presented here are examples of the misunderstanding of the two sources 
of law by, frequently, the most senior appeal courts in the UK and are presented to exemplify 
the misconstruction of legal principles and doctrine, not decisions based on case facts.  
 
I. The RTA88 
 
Beginning with the RTA88, the present scope of ss. 143, 145, 148, 150, 151(4), 151(5) in 
relation to 151(8), 185, and 192
36
 cause problems with a consistent interpretation with the 
MVID and remain in breach of EU law. Section 143 requires that “a person must not use a 
motor vehicle on a road [or other public place] unless there is in force… such a policy of 
insurance… as complies with the requirements of this part of the Act.”37 This section is in 
breach of Articles 1 and 3 of the MVID and the rulings of Vnuk
38
 and subsequent case 
authorities, and this breach continues in relation to ss. 145 and 185 RTA88 with the definition 
of “motor vehicle.” In Vnuk,39 the Court of Justice extended the requirement for compulsory 
motor vehicle insurance to apply to private land. This was in contradiction with the RTA88 
which limits compulsory insurance to a “road or other public place.”40 Despite further rulings 
confirming this point of law (notably in Andrade
41
 and Juliana),
42
 and that Vnuk
43
 was 
decided in 2014, the RTA88 still has not been amended nor has definitive guidance, to aid 
legal certainty,
44
 been issued by the UK government. These cases, not only explaining the 
                                                 
33
 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2015] EWCA Civ 172. 
34
 EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267. 
35
 Supra note 16. 
36
 The definition of road or other public place. This section of the RTA88 breaches Articles 1 and 3 of the 6
th
 
MVID. 
37
 Similar requirements are placed on authorized insurers in s. 145 RTA88. 
38
 Case C-162/13 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav [2014] EUECJ C-162/13. [2016] RTR 10. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Section 145. 
41
 Case C‑ 514/16 Isabel Maria Pinheiro Vieira Rodrigues de Andrade, Fausto da Silva Rodrigues de Andrade 
v José Manuel Proença Salvador, Crédito Agrícola Seguros — Companhia de Seguros de Ramos Reais SA, 
Jorge Oliveira Pinto [2018] 4 WLR 75, [2017] WLR(D) 788, ECLI:EU:C:2017:908, [2017] EUECJ C-514/16, 
EU:C:2017:908. 
42
 Case C-80/17 Fundo de Garantia Automóvel v Alina Antónia Destapado Pão Mole Juliana and Cristiana 
Micaela Caetano Juliana [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:661. 
43
 Supra note 38. 
44
 Which is a fundamental aspect of EU law. See Case C-308/06 R (International Association of Independent 
Tanker Owners (Intertanko)) v Secretary of State for Transport [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 260, para 69 where the 
Court said: “The general principle of legal certainty, which is a fundamental principle of Community law, 
 7 
requirement for insurance for vehicles used on private land, also explained the law relating to 
the concept of the “use of a vehicle.” However, in Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance45 
the Supreme Court misinterpreted UK national law and failed to give effect to these rulings.
46
 
Similarly, in Pilling v UK Insurance
47
 the Supreme Court also failed to reflect the geographic 
scope of the MVID and the incompatibility with s.145 RTA88. 
 
Section 148 includes statutory exclusion clauses in motor insurance policies which, if found, 
are to be held as void. Section 148(2) allows insurers to escape their responsibilities unless 
the exclusion falls into one of the “matters”48 as specified in that section.49 It had been 
questioned in Delaney
50
 whether the list of matters was illustrative or exhaustive. An 
exclusion of liability for domestic insurers is permissible in the MVID (at Article 13)
51
 and 
this is the only exclusion clause allowed. The UK’s approach, that s. 148(2) is to be 
interpreted as exhaustive and therefore any exclusion of liability outside of these prohibited 
“matters” is allowed, continues in its legislative form, but is clearly wrong in terms of EU 
law. The Court of Justice had previously held that the exclusion clause included under Article 
13 of the MVID was exhaustive,
52
 but nevertheless, other exclusion clauses should not totally 
prevent third-party victims of their rights as responsibility to provide a remedy to third-party 
victims could be shifted to the national compensatory body (as required under Article 10 of 
the same Directive).
53
 In either way third-party victims must not be left uncompensated. 
Member States may need to regard the exclusion clauses in Article 13 of the MVID as a 
minimum requirement, and other exclusions may be only considered in respect of first, not 
third, party victims. The Court of Justice later clarified the issue surrounding the 
permissibility of other exclusion clauses. No other exclusions can be used against third-party 
                                                                                                                                                       
requires, in particular, that rules should be clear and precise, so that individuals may ascertain unequivocally 
what their rights and obligations are and may take steps accordingly (see [Belgium v Commission (Case C-
110/03) [2005] ECR I-2801, para 30, and IATA and ELFAA (Case C- 344/04) [2006] ECR I-403, para 68]). 
45
 Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance [2019] UKSC 6. 
46
 For commentary see Nicholas Bevan, Principle v Process 15 March NEW LAW JOURNAL 14 (2019). 
47
 R & S Pilling t/a Phoenix Engineering v UK Insurance Ltd [2019] UKSC 16. 
48
 Which include the age or physical/mental condition of persons driving the vehicle; the condition of the 
vehicle (for example, a car’s illegally worn (bald) tyres); the number of persons that the vehicle carries; the 
weight/physical characteristics of the goods which the vehicle carries; the time at which/areas within which a 
vehicle is used; the horsepower/cylinder capacity or value of the vehicle; the carrying on the vehicle of 
particular apparatus; or the carrying on the vehicle of any particular means of identification other than that 
required by law. 
49
 It is interesting to note that the exclusion clauses in s. 148(2) RTA88 continue, yet the (similarly unlawful) 
provision in s. 152 RTA88 has recently been removed in The Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2019. 
50
 Supra note 33. 
51
 Article 13 identifies permissible exclusions in respect of third-party victims of road traffic accidents. Under 
this Article, neither statutory exclusions nor contractual clauses can be used by insurers to avoid liabilities for 
claims made by third-party victims. However, the Directive does allow a single exclusion where the victim 
knew that the vehicle he or she is travelling in is stolen and they voluntarily allowed themselves to be a 
passenger - and the insurer can prove that. Hence this requires actual knowledge on the part of the victim and 
that the insurer or compensatory body – the MIB in the UK – can prove this. 
52
 Case C-129/94 Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829. 
53
 Member States are, under Article 10, required to set up a body with a fund that shall be always available for 
unsatisfied judgments. Its primary task, in other words, is to ensure that victims of uninsured or untraced drivers 
are compensated to the minimum (required) level of compensation that they might secure had the driver causing 
the accident been insured and the claim brought against their insurer. However, the chosen body has its liability 
limited to only those vehicles which fall under Article 3, which means that the compensatory body is not 
responsible for claims caused by derogated vehicles. Nonetheless, this exception is not to be misinterpreted by 
Member States to avoid liability towards victims of such vehicles, but the States are required to provide another 
mechanism of compensation such as local authority insurers, securities or another compensation scheme. 
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victims.
54
 The Court of Justice in a string of authorities (Bernaldez,
55
 Correia Ferreira v 
Companhia de Seguros Mundial Confiança SA,
56
 Candolin v Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtio 
Pohjola,
57
 Farrell v Whitty,
58
 and Churchill v Wilkinson and Tracey Evans)
59
 identify the 
exclusions as illustrative and they cannot be viewed as exhaustive (thereby allowing all other 
exclusions not expressly precluded in this list). In other words, the Court regarded the 
exclusion clause allowed under Article 13 as illustrative of what cannot be used against third-
party victims. In this respect, unlike exhaustive exclusions, illustrative clauses can be used as 
guidance by Member States to operate in line with the protective purpose of the MVID by, 
for instance, using Pfeiffer
60
 to impose similar prohibited exclusions when it comes to third-
party victims’ rights, and to ensure consistency across the Community. Failure to prohibit the 
use of a wider range of exclusion clauses may lead to a limiting of third-party victims’ rights 
to access compensation which might lead to different levels of cover depending on where the 
accident takes place. Such disparities oppose the uniformity of protection across the 
Community that the MVID aim to achieve. Therefore, third-party victims’ rights must be 
ensured access to fair compensation, either by insurers or the Compensatory Body, 
regardless.
61
 Returning to UK national law, the law is not certain in this respect as to limit 
insurers’ rights of applying exclusion clauses other than the that stated in Article 13 of the 
MVID. The law does permit a greater range of exclusion clauses through which an insurer is 
still capable of undermining third-party victims’ rights enshrined by the MVID. 
 
Section 150 RTA88 relates to insurance policies being issued on the basis of use of the 
vehicle for “social and domestic” use only. This provision breaches Articles 3 and 12(1) 
MVID and has required the judiciary in the UK to be creative in finding mechanisms and 
factual constructions to provide protection for third-party victims.
62
  
 
Section 151(4) relates to an exclusion of an insurer’s responsibility on the basis of the 
knowledge (which in the UK context may involve constructive knowledge) of the theft or the 
unlawful taking of a vehicle where the third-party (passenger) is injured. Such an exclusion 
breaches the permissible exclusion identified in Article 13(1) of the MVID. Section 151(5) 
RTA88 places a burden on to insurers to fulfil the cover provided in the policy of insurance, 
regardless of the breach of the policyholder, but, in conjunction with s. 151(8), allows the 
insurer to recover any funds paid to the third-party victim from the policyholder. It is possible 
that the third-party victim may also be the policyholder (as per Churchill Insurance v 
                                                 
54
 Article 3 is perhaps the most important with regards to the obligation imposed on Members States to ensure 
third-party victims of road traffic accidents are protected. Under this Article, Member States must ensure that 
civil liability, in regard of the use of a vehicle on their territory, is covered by a minimum of third-party cover to 
ensure victims suffering loss or injury in the use of vehicles have their fair compensation met. According to 
Article 3, insurers are liable and shall compensate third-party victims of road traffic accidents for any personal 
injuries arising out of the use of a vehicle, regardless of the degree of relation between passengers and the 
policyholder. 
55
 Supra note 52. 
56
 Case C-348/98 Vitor Manuel Mendes Ferreira and Maria Clara Delgado Correia Ferreira v Companhia de 
Seguros Mundial Confiança SA [2000] ECR 1-6711. 
57
 Case C-537/03 Katja Candolin, Jari-Antero Viljaniemi and Veli-Matti Paananen v 
Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhti&ouml Pohjola and Jarno Ruokoranta [2005] ECR I-5745. 
58
 Case C-356/05 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty [2007] ECR I-3067.  
59
 Case C-442/10 Churchill Insurance Company Limited v Benjamin Wilkinson and Tracy Evans v Equity 
Claims Limited [2011] ECR I-00000. 
60
 Supra note 8. 
61
 Subjected to the only permitted exclusion clause in Article 13 of the MVID. 
62
 E.g. Seddon v Binions [1978] RTR 163 and Keeley v Pashen [2004] EWCA Civ 1491. 
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Wilkinson and Tracey Evans)
63
 and it is this application of the two aspects of the RTA88 
which breach Article 13 MVID.  
 
In Delaney v Pickett,
64
 the insurer was successful in obtaining a declaration from the courts 
under s. 152(2) RTA88 due to the insured driver having failed to disclose relevant and 
material facts which would otherwise have affected the insurer’s decision to provide cover. 
This has recently been repealed through reg. 6 of the Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2019. However, the Delaney
65
 decision was issued 
in 2011, the Regulations revoking the offending provision of the RTA88 were effective from 
1 November 2019, and significantly, the Court of Justice had ruled that such exclusions were 
contrary to the MVID in Bernaldez
66
 from 1996! Indeed, even though a consistent ruling was 
issued by the Court of Justice in Fidelidade-Compania de Seguros SA v Caisse Suisse de 
Compensation,
67
 the UK’s breach of the MVID and inconsistency with the jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice was rejected by Ouseley J in the RoadPeace v Secretary of State for 
Transport and Motor Insurers’ Bureau68 judicial review hearing. As recently as 2019 in 
Colley v Shuker
69
 the s. 152 RTA88 exclusion was still being applied and used by insurers to 
escape their responsibilities.  
 
Finally, at s. 192, the definition of “road” continues despite the implications of Vnuk70 and 
the possible misreading as to their rights and obligations this creates for users (and arguably) 
insurers. 
 
II. The MIB Agreements: The UDA and the UtDA 
 
It is true that there is another route for compensation for third-party victims to follow (where 
insurers succeed in avoiding liability) in the event that the insurer choses to exercise an 
exclusion clause. This is where the national compensatory body (the MIB) would be involved 
through one of the Agreements (UDA or UtDA) – either dealing with the third-party victim’s 
claim directly or where the insurer would manage the claim through the UDA / UtDA itself. 
The question, though, is whether the scheme managed by the MIB offers comparable 
compensation and access to protection as a claim directly against the insurer on the terms 
found in the policy of insurance. The UK’s compensation scheme, which is supposedly 
designed to protect third-party victims of uninsured drivers / untraced vehicles, cannot be 
deemed to be fully implementing the MVID and it would be a potential aspect for future 
disputes as the current compensation scheme is neither equivalent nor effective in this respect 
to that required in the MVID. The failure is due to technical knock-out clauses, conflicting 
provisions and unfair procedural rules that innocent victims face when they are required to 
pursue their claims through the MIB Agreements which result in claims being concluded with 
less or no compensation awarded to victims at all. When scrutinized, it becomes readily 
obvious that the MIB’s Agreements, when compared with the minimum standards required 
under Community law, offer a level of protection to third-party victims that is neither 
equivalent to that under the Community law nor under similar claims made directly against 
                                                 
63
 Supra note 59. 
64
 Supra note 33. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Supra note 52. 
67
 Case 287/16 Fidelidade Companhia de Seguros SA v Caisse Suisse De Compensation [2017] EUECJ. 
68
 Supra note 15. 
69
 Colley v Shuker [2019] EWHC 781 (QB). 
70
 Supra note 38. 
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insured drivers. The MIB may argue that its Agreements comply with the MVID and the 
current differences are not so significant as to hold it (the MIB) to be in breach of the 
Directive. However, no matter how small the (perceived) violation of the protection, the 
result is that the effects of the MVID are undermined by the Agreements. In Bernaldez
71
 the 
Court of Justice stated that insurers can neither rely on contractual terms nor on national law 
in order to avoid a claim raised by third-party victims. Bernaldez
72
 requires Member States to 
ensure the effectiveness of the MVID to protect third-party victims of motor accidents. 
Therefore, the UK is obliged to take into account the EU principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness
73
 when dealing with claims made against uninsured drivers and in respect of 
untraced vehicles. Procedural rules imposed under the UDA 2015 as well as the UtDA 2017 
must not deprive innocent third-party victims of road traffic accidents of their rights but to 
ensure the right amount of compensation is awarded.
74
 In other words, to ensure effectiveness 
and equivalence in this respect, such claims shall follow the same procedural rules and get 
the same award as had it been dealt and awarded by insurers, which is not the case, at least 
for now, under the current MIB compensation scheme.  
 
At cl 5 of the UDA 2015, the MIB is not liable for any claim “arising out of the use of a 
vehicle which is not required to be covered by a contract of insurance
75
 unless the use is in 
fact covered by a contract of insurance.” Bodies do exist which would generally be able to 
meet claims in the event of them possessing no insurance cover for accidents involving their 
vehicles - the National Health Service and the police are perhaps the most obvious examples. 
The MVID, at Article 5, makes no such exception and the result is that a victim of an 
unauthorised driver (such as, for example, a “joy rider” who steals such a vehicle and causes 
an accident in the course of this venture) would be unable to recover damages from the MIB, 
which as a body exists to be the insurer of last resort. Clause 6 enables the MIB to avoid 
liability and/or deduct from payments any amount that a claimant would have been able to 
secure from another source (admittedly subject to certain exclusions). This might include 
from bodies such as the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority but would also include 
those from an employer’s non-insured refundable advance. This deduction of compensation 
even extends to situations where the claimant failed to use, or to claim within the required 
time limits, from a personal insurance scheme. Whilst Article 10 MVID does allow for 
Member States to make deductions from a victim’s compensation payments, this was 
included to prevent the double payment of compensation (thus where Article 10 specifically 
refers to “social security bodies required to compensate the victim in respect of the same 
accident”). It does not exist to permit subrogation against victims of motor vehicle accidents. 
Clause 8 is applicable to situations where the victim allowed themselves to be a passenger in 
a vehicle to which either before the start of the claimant’s journey or after its start, they 
knew or had reason to believe that (a) the vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully taken; or 
(b) the vehicle was being used without there being in force a contract of insurance complying 
with the RTA88. MVID Article 10(2) permits the exclusion of liability from the MIB in 
relation to persons who the Member State (or in this instance the MIB) can prove / knew the 
vehicle in which they were travelling was uninsured. In White v White,
76
 the House of Lords 
at para. 34 of the judgment, extended the concept of knowledge to “turning a blind eye” as to 
                                                 
71
 Supra note 52. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Case C-120/97 Upjohn Ltd v The Licensing Authority established by the Medicines Act 1968 and Others 
[1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:14 at para. 32. 
74
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whether insurance was held or not. However, there is no such inclusion of constructive 
knowledge in the MVID. It is clear that actual knowledge is required for the application of 
the MVID, and nothing less than this will offer the victim the same level of protection. 
 
The UtDA 2017 is the most recently altered of the MIB’s Agreements (it was effective for 
accidents occurring on and after 1 March 2017) yet it continues to breach aspects of the 
MVID. Some of the provisions included are merely archaic,
77
 yet they are fundamentally 
disadvantageous to potential claimants to the MIB. Beginning at s.1(5), the UtDA defines an 
“authorised person” as “a person acting on the claimant’s behalf who is recognised in law as 
having authority so to act but this does not include a solicitor or other legal representative of 
the claimant, unless appointed as the claimant’s Guardian or Deputy or a person authorised 
under an Intervention Order pursuant to section 53 of the Adults Incapacity (Scotland) Act 
2000” (authors’ emphasis). This definition is important in respect of cl. 10(1) which requires 
that the claimant, albeit with the assistance of an authorised person, comply with the 
requirements of the clause. Failure to comply enables the MIB to reject the claim. The clause 
specifically removes the right for a claimant to be assisted in their action with the MIB with 
qualified legal representatives. Given the plethora of irrelevant materials to which the MIB 
might require the claimant to provide access, and perhaps a solicitor would be aware of the 
potential problems and harm this might cause the claimant better than a non-legally qualified 
lay person, the specific removal of lawyers from this aspect of the claim is as surprising as it 
is worrisome. Completing the claim and early correspondence with the MIB is often the first, 
crucial stage, in a claim and to not enable a victim to have assistance from a solicitor is quite 
unusual. 
 
The UtDA include various procedural aspects which contradict or undermine the effectiveness of the 
MVID. With regards to damage sustained to property, the UtDA stipulates that an award is 
conditional on a claimant suffering personal injury from the same accident. The injury must 
however be “significant” in order for the MIB to proceed the claim for property damage and 
this means the value of any claims must exceed £400. Such requirements reflect a general 
lack of good faith and whilst the MIB may argue for the need to take these measures to 
prevent fraud, they nevertheless should not operate at the expense of innocent victims of 
untraced drivers. There should, rather, be a balanced assessment given it is the duty of the 
MIB to have the right measures to control for such issues, not the victims. Therefore, the 
MIB should not be in a position to exploit such incidents to undermine third-party victims’ 
rights of untraced drivers and thereby the MVID.  
 
Under cl 8(1) of the UtDA 2017, the MIB has the right to deny any liability in respect of 
death, bodily injury or property damage arising out of the use of a vehicle where a claimant 
voluntarily let themselves to be a passenger in a vehicle and they “knew or ought to have 
known” that the concerned vehicle; a) was stolen or unlawfully taken, or b) uninsured 
according to the national requirement (Pt VI of the RTA 1988). This wording, already 
identified in the line of judicial reasoning outlined above, continues to use the constructive 
knowledge definition which is beyond that allowed in the MVID and thereby negatively 
                                                 
77
 For example, at cl. 24, the MIB requires notice of documents and claims to be served to it via fax or recorded 
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affects the efficacy and protective purpose of the Directive. Indeed, it is in a practical sense 
difficult to ascertain how a passenger would know, and this being proved, that a vehicle was 
uninsured. If the MIB can prove that the claimant knew or had reason to believe in any of 
such matters then the MIB would be deemed to discharge its duty in respect of knowledge. 
The knowledge requirements under this Agreement seems to be sufficiently wide to make it 
easy for the MIB to shift the burden of proof to the victim, which can be deemed to breach 
the clear and simple requirement applied under the MVID (see Phillips v Rafiq).
78
 
 
There are certain requirements that any law is expected to respect (and beyond the formalities 
of its construction and adherence to constitutional requirements it should, as a minimum, 
provide a level of legal certainty) otherwise its legitimacy may be called into question. One 
of the fundamental requirements of the UK’s constitution and the rationale advanced for 
contravening aspects of the RTA88 and the UDA and UtDA to be disapplied stems from the 
European Communities Act 1972 and associated case law which provides a means for the 
courts to adopt this course of action if they so choose. It is argued here that the UK’s motor 
insurance laws breach fundamental principles of EU law. The national laws (the RTA88 and 
the MIB Agreements) may be argued to breach aspects of the EU’s free movement principles 
when failing to provide the necessary protection for EU citizens (here it would be third-party 
victims of motor vehicle accidents). The national law further breaches fundamental principles 
to ensure legal certainty as it contradicts its EU parent law (although these would not find the 
remedy in national law being disapplied). Community citizens, under this current regime, 
cannot accurately nor adequately predict their legal position and therefore their rights in 
advance when they decide to travel to, work or even live in the UK. The UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU (otherwise referred to as “Brexit”) becomes another source of uncertainty as to 
whether the UK will leave the Single Market and Customs Union which will, if the UK 
chooses to leave without agreements, end the UK’s duty to fulfill the free movement 
principles. Furthermore, although not specifically pertinent to the arguments advanced here, 
national law possibly breaches Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights as it 
impinges on citizens’ right to access to justice. Finally, currently national law does not 
comply with the effectiveness and equivalence principles required under EU law.
79
 The 
earlier mentioned principles, as they pertain to breaches of EU fundamental principles, are 
discussed to explain and offer a legal basis for the advancement of disapplying inconsistent 
national laws which breach superior EU laws.     
 
The arguments presented above have been used to not only identify some of the inconsistent 
judicial practices in the (mis)application of UK national laws in respect of EU law, but also to 
highlight some of the procedural and administrative functions which operate to transgress EU 
law in the UK. Case law is now presented to argue how it is constitutionally possible for 
national legislation and administrative agreements to be disapplied for breaching EU Treaty 
Articles and Directive provisions.  
 
E. Disapplying the RTA88, UDA and UtDA: The Constitutional Argument 
 
It will likely be questioned in the first instance why, in 2020, is an argument being presented 
to use a case established in 1991 to give effect to superior EU law in the courts of a Member 
State. Surely the brightest legal minds will have considered, and by implication rejected, such 
an argument. We write this because naturally this is the “elephant in the room” and without 
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addressing it from the outset, it will play on the minds of the reader and possibly distract 
from the opinions presented. Factortame
80
 began the constitutional revolution in the UK 
whereby an Act which had been established that transgressed EU law should not be enforced. 
The case law then progressed through Thoburn
81
 which discussed the different types of Acts 
and their constitutional hierarchy. Finally, HS2
82
 has enabled the Supreme Court to reflect on 
the potential for the disapplication of an Act due to incompatibility with a Directive. Hence, 
given the problems inherent with the statutory (RTA88) and extra-statutory provisions (the 
UDA and UtDA) when considered in light of the MVID and free movement principles, and 
that in MIB v Lewis
83
 the UK appeal courts seem to accept the transgression of EU law (in 
some respects) and the status of the MIB and the direct effect of Articles 3 and 10 of the 
MVID, it seems an apt time to discuss the potential for the offending national laws to be 
disapplied as contravening the effectiveness of EU law. 
 
If one begins by examining the constitution upon which the UK is based, one of the first 
theorists that springs to mind is Dicey who, as famously instructed to all first-year English 
law students, concluded that the sovereignty of Parliament is supreme – limitless – and 
therefore it may make and unmake any laws which it chooses. Significantly, “no person or 
body is recognized by the law… as having the right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament.”84 Thus, the legal power vested in the country is qualified by a political reality 
and this, for Dicey, is the only hierarchy in place. There is, of course, a hierarchy in existence 
within the sources of law which will be seen between Acts of Parliament, the common law, 
conventions and customs. This is natural. However, the issue is that for Dicey that the Acts 
themselves are of the same legal power and significance. He did not seek to establish a 
hierarchy amongst them. Given the flatness of the structure proposed, the legal status of each 
Act of Parliament is the same. 
 
This view of the legal landscape in which primary legislation exists fails to take into account 
the development of the legal system of the UK, and of what at least became known as 
constitutional statutes – those which were so fundamental that they could not be, implicitly at 
least, reversed (through implied repeal). Thus, whilst they became entrenched in the UK’s 
legal system there remained the possibility of an explicit repeal by a future Parliament if 
indeed the political will allowed. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the Human Rights Act 
1998 and, especially for the purposes of this article, the European Communities Act (ECA) 
1972 are each examples of Acts of Parliament which had the status granted to them of 
moving beyond “ordinary” Acts and becoming “constitutional.” 
 
We can therefore move forwards on the basis that whilst the UK Parliament and its law-
making remains supreme, the content of the laws it produces are subject to a hierarchy in 
which some Acts have greater powers and significance than others. To begin, it is important 
to recognize the fundamental impact that the case Factortame
85
 had on the UK legal system, 
the rights of individuals within the Member States of the EU, and the obligations facing 
Member States and the supremacy of EU law over inconsistent national law. 
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I. Supremacy of EU Law: A National Courts’ Duty? 
 
National courts of EU Member States have a duty to ensure that the principles of Community 
law are protected, and they voluntarily undertook this duty. Lord Denning’s statement in 
Macarthys v Smith
86
 reflects how in the UK this was achieved through Parliament 
surrendering its sovereignty to the EU through s 2 ECA 1972. However, the surrendering was 
a voluntary act of Parliament and one which it could override if it should so choose. He 
stated: 
 
If the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the 
intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision in it or intentionally of acting 
inconsistently with it and says so in express terms then I should have thought that it 
would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute of our Parliament.
87
  
 
Consequently, unless explicitly provided for in the text or preamble of an Act, Parliament’s 
intention when it legislates is to follow and, if applicable, to give effect to EU law. As 
demonstrated in Unibet (London) Ltd v Justitiekanslern,
88
 for instance, many authorities were 
provided where EU Member States are obliged to give effect to the Community law and to 
ensure that rights conferred on EU individuals by these laws are protected. Therefore, and to 
do so, national courts must work in conformity with EU law and take into account the 
purpose of EU legislation to ensure compatibility and a consistency in approach. Further, in R 
v Transport Secretary Ex p Factortame Ltd (No.2)
89
 Lord Bridge stated that the ECA 1972 is 
clear that EU Member States shall give priority to Community law where there are conflicts 
with national laws. National courts cannot compromise on individuals’ rights, or permit any 
breaches to EU principles. Moreover, Lord Harwich held that Community rights conferred on 
EU citizens were to be protected by national courts and could be, in these circumstances, 
directly enforced. In this respect, the courts in Member States are not allowed to undermine 
Community law by, for instance, preventing its effectiveness. To give effect to this principle, 
national courts were able to set aside any rules that undermine the effectiveness of EU law 
and were to enforce Community law.
90
 However, in regard of an award for damage to victims 
of a State’s failure to implement EU law as required (Francovich),91 Evans v Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions
92
 clarified that such award is only 
granted conditional on the satisfaction of three conditions (i) the law in breach shall grant 
individual direct right in regard of the disputed area; (ii) the breach shall be sufficiently 
serious; and (iii) the loss to the victim was the direct consequence of the breach by the State 
(the loss was due to direct failure of implementing EU law).  
 
II. The Tri-Partite Test – The Limiting Factor 
 
It was in Delaney v Pickett
93
 where the Court of Appeal referred to the judgment of Jay J at 
first instance where he held that the MVID satisfied the tests and allowed the claimant to 
recover damages from the UK. Typically, it is the second test which limits the success of 
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recovering compensation. It is trite comment and the arguments are well rehearsed elsewhere 
but essentially Member States were to be protected where they had breached EU law, and this 
had caused the claimant quantifiable loss, but this had been the result of an innocent mistake 
or administrative error on the part of the State. It would be unfair to hold a State liable for 
each loss sustained by claimants in such circumstances, particularly when the Court of Justice 
was placed as a court of reference to determine any error and offer more clear and purposive 
instruction as to the point of law or the interpretation that should have been used by the court. 
The result was the “sufficiently serious” element of the test which negated the efficacy of the 
remedy of state liability. Of course, in relation to the MVID, the breaches of EU laws and 
principles in national law have often been so flagrant and clear that they pass the threshold 
for establishing the State’s liability. Nevertheless, and as mentioned earlier, even though 
Francovich
94
 offers some method of remedying the financial losses suffered by the claimant, 
it does not correct the wrong (the breach) by bringing the national law in breach into line with 
its EU parent. Consequently, the victims who choose not to seek this route of remedy would 
suffer the negative consequences of being left uncompensated, which opposes the protective 
purpose of the MVID to facilitate free movement of people and goods throughout the 
Community (see Article 4 MVID which prohibits Member States to carry out insurance 
border checks on vehicles based in other Member States as such checks could amount to a 
hinderance of the principle of free movement).   
 
III. Key Cases and the Development of the UK Constitution 
 
It is unlikely to be controversial to comment that one of the most remarkable movements in 
the history of the EU was the Court of Justice ruling in Von Colson and Kamann v Land 
Nordrhein-Westfalen.
95
 Here the court empowered national courts to interpret its laws 
rationally in accordance with the wording and the aims of EU law. The EU had created, it 
will be remembered, a “new legal order” in which EU law was superior to national law which 
was a principle establishing the indirect effect of EU law.
96
 In Marleasing,
97
 the Court of 
Justice instructed the courts of Member States that they should, as far as is possible, interpret 
national law to give effect to the content and spirit of the EU parent. This philosophy was 
furthered in 2004 with the Court’s ruling in Bernhard Pfeiffer et alia v Deutsches Rotes 
Kreuz, Kreisverband Walshut eV.
98
 Here those same national courts, it was emphasized by 
the Court of Justice, should play a greater role in protecting individuals’ rights conferred on 
them by EU laws when interpreting national law. Concurrently, national courts were charged 
with not preventing any provision from undermining the purpose of the MVID.
99
 These cases 
established that, even prior to the UK joining the EU, EU law was accepted (and had to be 
accepted by new entrant States) as superior to national law. Without such a ceding of 
sovereignty the legal system of the EU and the development from an economic community to 
a union of States would not be achievable. The States, in ensuring EU law was superior to 
national law would have their rights to establish new laws in contradiction of EU law 
curtailed. When interpreting and applying existing laws, which either were created to 
transpose the effects of secondary sources of EU law (Directives) or could be interpreted as 
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being affected by an EU law, the courts in those jurisdictions had a positive duty to give 
effect to the EU law (direct parent law or not). Even with the duty of purposive statutory 
interpretation applying to national / EU law, numerous examples have been presented in this 
article where national courts have adopted a holistic approach and concluded that, on the 
whole, national law conforms with the requirements of the MVID (see Roadpeace).
100
 
Therefore, the value of the Marleasing
101
 / Pfeiffer
102
 line of reasoning in establishing a 
consistent interpretation of national law in light of the MVID has been haphazard and has not 
produced any semblance of legal certainty for any of the parties to motor vehicle insurance 
law. While much of this article uses cases where the national court has failed to interpret 
national law consistently with the MVID, positive examples do exist (for example Churchill 
v Wilkinson).
103
  
 
Most recently in MIB v Lewis
104
 the Court of Appeal held the MIB to be an emanation of the 
State (reversing years of inconsistent national rulings – indeed by the same judge who had 
previously ruled that the MIB did not possess this status). It also confirmed the direct effect 
of both Articles 3 and 10 MVID. This will provide a greater range of rights to be exercised in 
UK national courts – basing arguments directly on Articles 3 and 10 MVID and thus 
superseding the offending aspects of the RTA88, the UDA and the UtDA. However, and to 
place the significance of this judgment in context, the direct effect of the Articles will not, in 
the absence of knowledgeable lawyers and a receptive judiciary, result in significant change 
in the application of the law. For legal certainty, the case law may be amended through 
subsequent judgments but the provisions within the legislation and extra-statutory 
Agreements will not be changed (which compromises legal certainty). However, the status of 
the MIB, as a body of the State, will perhaps ease the argument that the Agreements it 
produces with the Secretary of State are susceptible to disapplication in a similar way to Acts 
of Parliament and functioning administrative agreements. 
 
Ultimately, the UK judiciary too often seem unwilling to consider EU law when establishing 
a ruling, or cases heard at the same time but in different courts in the UK have opposite views 
on how to give effect to EU law,
105
 which leads to an inconsistent interpretation between the 
two laws. This in turn undermines the protective purpose of the MVID.  
 
IV. Factortame, Thoburn and HS2: A Triumvirate of Constitutional Development 
 
If an argument is to be made that it is perhaps necessary, and possible – both legally and 
politically – to disapply the RTA88, UDA and UtDA in areas where they breach the MVID, 
it is right to begin with the case which established the change in the UK’s constitution. The 
UK does not possess a constitutional court, its constitution is uncodified and subject to 
change, and the separation of powers does not grant a right for any court to strike down 
legislation. These facts are an established feature in UK constitutional law. 
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IV.1. Factortame 
 
The problem in this case began when Spanish owned vessels started overfishing in UK 
territorial waters. Under the Treaty of Rome, the free movement principles enabled EU 
citizens to enter another Member State with the intention of working. The Spanish fishermen 
were such individuals. They had started by fishing and selling their catch in their home 
country, but soon discovered that other fish which did not sell particularly well in Spain did 
have a market in the UK. This lead to the influx of new entrants to the fishing market in the 
UK and local fishermen were concerned about their livelihoods. It has to be remembered that 
these fishermen were fishing around the ports in the South of the country and these were 
traditionally Conservative-voting constituencies. With a threat that these areas would change 
their political votes, especially having seen what the Conservative governments had done to 
the coal and steel industries in the North of the country, the Government was faced with a 
problem. Should it follow EU law and continue to allow the Spanish fishermen (and citizens 
from other Member States) access to the waters and the fish, or should it establish legislation 
to curtail the influx? The result was the Government ceding to the pressure by the national 
fishing lobby and enacting the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 (MSA88).  The MSA88 imposed 
conditions on those who wished to fish in British waters. Either the fishermen had to be 
domiciled in the UK or the vessel itself had to be registered in the UK. This would effectively 
limit access to fishermen from other Member States who would be unlikely to wish to satisfy 
either criterion. Of course, the Act contradicts one of the most important principles of the 
Community (free movement). The argument presented in court
106
 was for the EU Treaty 
offending MSA88 to be disapplied so as not to breach this fundamental Treaty right. It was 
appealed to the House of Lords who believed that applying the requested intervention might 
subvert the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty as the MSA88 was approved by 
Parliament
107
 and the judiciary had no constitutional power to refuse to give effect to an Act 
of Parliament. Consequently, the Lords referred the case to the Court of Justice which 
declared that the MSA88 breached EU law and as the law of EU is supreme,
108
 interim relief 
was necessary and the UK chose to disapply the Act accordingly.
109
  
 
Prior to Factortame,
110
 it was understood that national courts have no power to strike down 
any legislation passed by the Parliament. The role of the courts is to interpret the law, not to 
make it.
111
 However, and although the Court of Justice empowers national courts of EU 
Member States to read and interpret legislation in a way that gives effect to EU law through 
consistent interpretation and methods of reasoning to ensure consistency in the Community, 
such empowerment is still limited in the UK and any interpretation must not go against the 
spirit of the UK legislation, in spite of the fact that Factortame
112
 is a British case. 
Nonetheless, this may raise another question of the constitutional position of the courts as its 
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interpretation of EU law may lead it to either overrule Parliament or to disregard EU law in a 
case of irreconcilable differences between the two. The ruling in Factortame
113
 provoked 
outrage as to how it undermines Parliamentary sovereignty.
114
 The government however, was 
not ignorant
115
 of the fact (as is also the case in matters related to third-party victims of road 
traffic accidents) that any legislation that undermines any principle of EU law such as free 
movement is a clear breach of EU law, which the UK is legally bound by, and negative 
consequences may follow as a result of passing the MSA88. However, the government’s 
challenge to the Court of Appeal was dismissed, and the House of Lords stated that the 
disapplication was due to a breach of one of the most important principles of Community 
law, and therefore justified in the circumstances.  
 
The MSA88 holds a unique place in the history of the UK constitution being the only Act 
which the courts would not apply. It was for Parliament to determine whether the MSA88 as 
it was written should be applied. If it was the intention of Parliament to breach a fundamental 
principle of EU law, it was able to do so. Adopting Denning’s position in Macarthys v 
Smith,
116
 the national courts would follow Parliament’s instruction to adhere to the national 
law even where it was in conflict with a superior EU law. The EU law in question was only 
superior in the instance of the MSA88 because Parliament had instructed the judiciary of this 
point in the ECA 1972 s 2,
 117
 and Parliament was equally empowered to revoke this 
instruction in relation to the MSA88 or generally to all laws if it chose.
118
 The Lords had 
decided that such a fundamental breach could not have been the intention of Parliament and 
they held accordingly.  
 
IV.2. Thoburn 
 
It will be noted that one of the most significant features of the Factortame (No. 2)
119
 case is 
that despite the importance that it has for the UK and its relationship with the EU, there is a 
general lack of detail and discussion on the constitutional theory and practicalities of, on the 
one hand, the principal of parliamentary sovereignty, and on the other the supremacy of EU 
law. It was not until 2002 in the Thoburn
120
 case where the reasoning of the court shed light 
on this particular issue. The case was widely known and considered at the turn of the new 
millennium. Council Directive 80/181/EEC had established the requirement for goods widely 
sold (exceptions were incorporated in the Directive but do not require consideration for the 
purposes of this article) to have the legal units of weight represented according to metric 
measurements. The Directive further allowed for supplementary indications of measurements 
– essentially allowing Member States such as the UK to continue using the Imperial 
measurement system until the end of 2009. The incorporation of the Directive in to national, 
amending legislation (the Weights and Measures Act 1985), led to four appellants, known 
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widely at the time as the “metric martyrs,” who had been convicted of offences relating to the 
use of Imperial measurements. It was in the use of the “Henry VIII” powers by the Secretary 
of State to amend the 1985 Act which was the focus of the appeal. The main argument was 
that the amendment to the 1985 Act had impliedly repealed s 2(2) of the ECA 1972 on the 
basis that the ECA 1972 established a general provision regarding amending legislation and 
the more recent 1985 Act was a specific provision. Laws LJ was not convinced with the legal 
basis of the argument but, to provide certainty regarding the issue in case he was incorrect in 
his analysis, Laws LJ continued by examining the nature of the ECA 1972 and whether and 
how implied appeal through inconsistent provisions in later statutes might affect its standing. 
Previous authorities were discussed and the fundamental principles which are very well 
known and need not be replicated here were considered. The result was that Parliament and 
the legislature cannot bind future parliaments – the doctrine of implied repeal continued as a 
fundamental matter of British national constitutional law. 
 
However, Laws LJ went further. He remarked that implied repeal is actually context sensitive 
and, as legislation could be “ordinary” or of a “constitutional” nature, implied repeal operates 
as it is known to do so in relation to ordinary legislation. With regards to constitutional 
statutes,
121
 these had to be treated differently. Therefore, at para. 63, Laws LJ considered: 
 
Ordinary statutes may be impliedly repealed. Constitutional statutes may not. For the 
repeal of a constitutional Act or the abrogation of a fundamental right to be effected 
by statute, the court would apply this test: is it shown that the legislature’s actual – not 
imputed, constructive or presumed – intention was to effect the repeal or abrogation? 
I think the test could only be met by express words in the later statute, or by words so 
specific that the inference of an actual determination to effect the result contended for 
was irresistible.  
 
The ECA 1972 is a constitutional statute, but the overriding nature of the UK’s Parliament, it 
being sovereign, must surely work to resist any limitations on its own power. Perhaps Wade 
is correct and sovereignty is now a “freely adjustable commodity.”122 The answer seems to be 
found in the text of the ECA 1972 itself and the powers it provides the judiciary in matters of 
resolving conflicts between national and EU laws. In terms of implied repeal, the ECA 1972 
is impenetrable to implicit repeal or contradiction, albeit still subject to the express repeal of 
a sovereign Parliament. Thus Thoburn
123
 establishes a continuation of the theory of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Therefore, in relation to any difference in approach by the 
judiciary in its interpretation of the RTA88, UDA, and UtDA, the ECA 1972 is immune from 
any sense of implied repeal. It takes precedence over the statute and extra-statutory 
provisions and the clear instruction in ECA 1972 s 2 that “All rights, powers, liabilities, 
obligations and restrictions… created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such 
remedies and procedures… provided for by or under the Treaties, are without further 
enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom” instructs the judiciary as 
to this supremacy. 
 
IV.3. R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport 
 
                                                 
121
 The Magna Carta; The Bill of Rights 1689; the European Communities Act 1972; the Human Rights Act 
1998; the Scotland Act 1998 and so on would likely be considered “constitutional” in nature. 
122
 Henry W.R Wade, Sovereignty – Revolution or Evolution?, 112 Law Quarterly Review 568 (1996) at 573. 
123
 Supra note 81. 
 20 
The case involved the application of Directive 2011/92/EU and its imposition of decision-
making in relation to, for the purposes of the case, the construction of the proposed high-
speed rail network known as HS2. The Supreme Court was tasked with deciding if the UK’s 
approach to the process adopted in HS2
124
 was in compliance with the requirements laid 
down in the Directive. The mechanism used to give effect to the transposition of the 
Directive was a “hybrid Bill” – one which begins life as a public bill, but which adds an 
additional select committee stage following the second reading in each House.
125
 It is at this 
stage where objections from those directly affected by the bill can be raised and where issues 
may be heard. It was this mechanism which was scrutinized by the Court with the issue of the 
potential concern that this form of scrutiny may encroach into the relationship between 
Parliament and the courts (per Lord Reed). It transpires that Lord Reed did not consider there 
to be any constitutional problem with the manner in which the Directive had to be 
implemented in national law, but what was interesting was the obiter provided where he 
hypothesized what would have been the result had there been such a problem from the 
Directive. 
 
Lord Reed surmised that had the Directive called upon the UK to adopt a system of close 
judicial scrutiny of a bill on its passage through Parliament, the aligning of EU law with 
national law would not have been as straightforward as the application of the doctrine of the 
supremacy of EU law. The doctrine derives from the ECA 1972 and matters regarding 
conflicts between constitutional principles must be resolved by national courts according to 
principles of national constitutional law. Further, Factortame (No. 2)
126
 was of no use in 
these circumstances as the matter there was the breach of EU law following the enactment of 
an Act of Parliament, not the process of the making of national law and its compatibility with 
superior EU law. The conclusion to be drawn is that in HS2,
127
 Lord Reed is explaining how 
the application of EU law in the creation and interpretation of national law is not merely 
subject to the existence of the ECA 1972, but rather includes many other dimensions to 
national constitutional law which may have an impact. 
 
V. Disapplication beyond the MSA88? 
 
The three cases mentioned come together to form the basis for a legal argument that the 
directly effective elements of the MVID, where they are breached by the RTA88, the UDA 
and the UtDA may lead to the disapplication of those offending aspects of national law. In 
Factortame (No. 2),
128
 the decision of the Lords to direct the disapplication of sections of the 
MSA88 was due to the ECA 1972 providing for EU law to take precedence over national law 
and the MSA88 Act not derogating from the constitutional powers of the ECA 1972. Had 
Parliament intended the MSA88 to take effect over the provisions contained in the ECA 1972 
it could and would have explicitly done so. Thoburn
129
 continues this approach of 
parliamentary sovereignty and pragmatic primacy of EU law by demonstrating Parliament’s 
continued power to derogate from EU law, albeit when it expressly identifies its intention to 
do so. The problem with this approach, whilst theoretically sound, is that it begins to unravel 
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when considered in reality. As has been demonstrated throughout the Brexit negotiations and 
internal wrangling in Parliament, it is not simply the case that the government can choose to 
remove or suspend parts of the ECA 1972 when it seems politically expedient to do so. This 
would require an Act of Parliament specifying the clear intention for the particular Act in 
question to be read as intending to circumvent or directly transgress aspects of the ECA 1972. 
In its absence, there would also be the political fall-out from the EU itself, a breach by the 
UK of its EU obligations and a denial of the legitimacy of the action by the Court of Justice. 
As a consequence, while the position in Thoburn
130
 is academically correct in as far as the 
UK’s ability to derogate from its EU obligations and the primacy of EU law is concerned, 
practically, however, this is little more than a theoretical construct. There also remains the 
very real issue of what type of statute will be necessary to override an existing constitutional 
statute. This calls into question issues of hierarchy between such laws and, as provided by 
Laws LJ at para. 63, a “specific” form of derogation will be required to achieve an “inference 
of an actual determination to effect the result contended for was irresistible.” This will allow 
for protection against accidental or incidental derogation, but the interpretation of such will 
fall to each court to determine. What it does not achieve though, is reconciling the stark 
difference between traditional legal theory (Thoburn
131
 reinforces the principle of sovereignty 
of Parliament and its legitimacy that specific legislation can derogate from otherwise 
entrenched legislation with the status of being “constitutional” in nature) and political reality. 
The UK voluntarily acceded to be a Member State of the EU and to accept with this status the 
primacy of EU over national law in areas where the EU has competence. It is naïve to infer 
that Parliament may simply express a willingness to override the EU Treaty and for this 
position to be accepted by the courts. Although, of course, this is what the Thoburn
132
 
judgment appeared to suggest. However, towards the conclusion of his judgment, Laws LJ 
offers an interesting insight into a modernizing of that constitutional view: 
 
[Parliament] Being sovereign, it cannot abandon its sovereignty... This is, of course, 
the traditional doctrine of sovereignty. If it is to be modified, it certainly cannot be 
done by the incorporation of external texts. The conditions of Parliament’s legislative 
supremacy in the United Kingdom necessarily remain in the UK’s hands. But the 
traditional doctrine has in my judgment been modified. It has been done by the 
common law, wholly consistently with constitutional principle.
133
 
 
Here Laws LJ notes that Parliament’s legislative authority derives from its common law roots 
and it is in the common law where it may be subject to modification. Therefore, as the 
common law is the source of Parliamentary sovereignty, it may also be used to alter what is 
known of as sovereignty. This, for Laws LJ at para. 60 of his judgment, has been ably 
demonstrated in respect of the creation of exceptions to the doctrine of implied repeal. It also 
permits, if such an argument is advanced to a natural conclusion, for the common law to 
decide, if it wishes, to create constitutional legislation which, through interpretation, are so 
important that it would be inappropriate for a Parliament to nullify – implicitly or explicitly. 
The common law will thereby be the arbiter of what might be recognized as constitutional 
legislation or conversely of a lesser hierarchical standing. Hence the Thoburn
134
 ruling is at 
times confused as to which authority (parliamentary or common law) determines the 
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entrenchment of legislation. Ultimately, Thoburn
135
 reflects a new view of the constitution. 
Here Parliament’s sovereignty is not so much a “political fact” in the Wade sense of its 
understanding,
136
 rather it is a legal phenomenon subject to the common law it need not 
invoke unconstitutional behavior on the part of the courts to produce a Factortame (No. 2)
137
 
and Thoburn
138
 result. These cases are the very result of the courts “discharging their 
constitutional role.”139 
 
This brings us to the most recent case of HS2.
140
 If we accept the proposition of Lord Reed in 
his dictum, the stark and binary distinction between ordinary legislation and constitutional 
legislation is too simplistic in approach. Thoburn
141
 established the distinction and hierarchy 
between ordinary and constitutional legislation, but left open the debate of whether all 
constitutional legislation is of the same status. Could there be nuances and hierarchies present 
in constitutional laws? This is the place where Lords Neuberger and Mance offered their 
reasoning on the matter by reference to: 
 
Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, one of the pillars of constitutional settlement which 
established the rule of law in England in the 17th century, precludes the impeaching 
or questioning in any court of debates or proceedings in Parliament. Article 9 was 
described by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the House of Lords in Pepper v Hart [1993] 
AC 593, 638, as “a provision of the highest constitutional importance” which “should 
not be narrowly construed”. 
 
Thus some constitutional principles may be more “constitutional” than others and could an 
EU Directive be constructed which would require national courts to set aside the principle 
due to the superiority of EU law? For Lords Neuberger and Mance the answer was that it 
probably would not. They seemed to misrepresent the House of Lords’ instruction relating to 
the treatment of national law which contradicts EU law via the ECA 1972 (that such 
legislation was to be held as “invalid” when really what the Lords held was that such laws 
could be dissapplied by the courts). However, they proceeded by explaining how the ECA 
1972 could not be interpreted as meaning that all legislation, especially those dealing with, 
for example, the rule of law, which were in conflict with EU law could be abrogated. 
 
The analysis of the above cases is used to demonstrate that the basic notion of the supremacy 
of EU law over inconsistent national law derives its status from the ECA 1972. This was 
established, if were needed, in Factortame (No. 2)
142
 and through Thoburn,
143
 the court 
further offered direction that the ECA 1972 was a constitutional statute and thus immune 
from implied repeal. For future legislation to override the principles of the ECA 1972 would 
have required specific and explicit repeal of those principles. More recently in HS2
144
 the 
Supreme Court explained how constitutional laws – be they legislative or established through 
the common law – are not equal and a hierarchy exists. Thereby explaining a further nuance 
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to laws which may be repealed and through which measures will be required. The ECA 1972 
was deemed to have the status of being fundamentally constitutional in nature and therefore 
Parliament did not intend for future legislation to abrogate the principles within it lightly. If 
we return to Thoburn
145
 it is readily evident that the RTA88 would be defined as ordinary 
legislation and would not require discussion of the hierarchy between constitutional laws. 
Essentially, the ECA 1972 trumps the RTA88, and using this analysis even more so in 
relation to administrative provisions contained within the UDA and UtDA (established as 
they were between a body designated as an emanation of the State and the Secretary of State), 
and it would follow that it is available to national courts to disapply those national provisions 
which contradict directly effective elements of an EU directive (superior EU laws). Certainly, 
the contradicting aspects of the RTA88, UDA and UtDA could not be read as overriding the 
judiciaries’ obligation flowing from ECA 1972 s 2 “to be given legal effect or used in the 
United Kingdom.” 
 
Of course, the entire purpose of the discussion provided by Lords Neuberger and Mance is to 
further explain the very blunt constitutional tool which is Parliament’s sovereignty that 
enables it to abrogate and derogate from EU law in as far as it chooses, albeit with the 
proviso that it makes such an intention sufficiently transparent and obvious. The judgment of 
the Lords tempers this approach through categorization of the ECA 1972 as being but one 
constitutional law which is potentially limited through the application of other constitutional 
laws – be they legislative or established through the common law. The status of the ECA 
1972 does not credit it with a power to prevail over all other inconsistent Acts of Parliament, 
but it does offer the starting point for arguments regarding the hierarchy and status of laws 
and whether implicit or explicit derogation is necessary to determine the primacy of EU law. 
This rejects the previously held view that the constitutional landscape as provided for by 
Dicey is flat and introduces a more uneven constitutional order which will require calibration 
through judicial pronouncement. 
 
F. The Goal of Remedying UK Motor Vehicle Insurance Law: Interim Relief or 
Permanent Disapplication? 
 
There is no such power that can prevent the UK’s national courts from granting interim relief 
or to permanently disapply the national motor insurance law otherwise such power would 
harm the effectiveness of EU law (see Schorsch Meier GmbH v Hennin).
146
 The MSA88 was 
believed to be in breach of a fundamental EU principle (free movement principle) where 
individuals and businesses used to rely on to have the right to access to the UK fishing quota 
as free movement shall not be restricted. Aspects of the motor insurance laws are in breach of 
the same EU fundamental principle (free movement). The applicants in Factortame,
147
 after 
an unsuccessful claim,
148
 sought judicial review in the UK and to remove restriction on their 
rights of fishing in the UK water.
149
 The judicial review, however, failed to achieve anything 
of substance. As the judicial order to restrain the government from the threat that the Act 
undermines EU law and to make restitution to the claimants was refused, the case was 
referred to the Court of Justice through the House of Lords.
150
 Thereafter, the Court of Justice 
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held that national laws of EU Member States should have no effect whatsoever beside EU 
law (national laws cannot prevent national courts from granting interim relief where EU law 
is involved in a dispute).
151
 The Court of Justice held that the provisions of the MSA88 
contravene EU law and therefore to be disapplied by UK national courts.
152
 In the light of the 
Court of Justice judgment, the House of Lords granted an injunction in favor of the claimant 
(Factortame).
153
 The motor insurance law has been challenged and many claims have proven 
unsuccessful. Some were referred to the Court of Justice and some compensation was 
granted. However, it failed to remove the illegality of exclusion clauses and procedural rules. 
A judicial review failed too to bring the law into line with EU law.
154
 Therefore, referral to 
the Court of Justice, if national courts failed to fulfil its duty and disapply the law, may need 
to be considered.   
 
The MSA88 was disapplied by the UK national courts and the victims of the 1988 Act were 
duly compensated. Therefore, the authors argue that the directly effective aspects of the 
MVID (Arts. 3 and 10) require the offending aspects of the RTA88, UDA and UtDA shall be 
disapplied and third-party victims of road traffic accidents who suffered losses or injuries in 
the past and failed to secure fair compensation due to breaches of EU law shall be 
compensated accordingly. For instance, in Factortame III
155
 the Court of Justice held that the 
European Commission can take actions against any EU Member States that could be liable 
for damages where it fails to comply with EU law. As explained earlier, the motor insurance 
law breaches more than one fundamental EU principle. Each of which is sufficient to have 
the law disapplied (the provisions and clauses in breach). 
 
The power to disapply the RTA88 due to its infringement of the free movement of goods and 
of persons is compelling when compared with the infringement occurring in Factortame.
156
 It 
will be remembered in Factortame
157
 that the affected Spanish fishermen were not prevented, 
entirely, from access to British waters to undertake their professional activities, rather the 
MSA88 applied conditions to be satisfied in order for such access to be effective. Hence, had 
the fishermen domiciled themselves in the UK or had registered their vessels in the UK, 
access would have been granted. Compare this with the current state of the RTA88. In its 
current reading and application, the Act does not prevent the free movement of people and 
goods from the EU to the UK. The RTA88 makes the provision for the protection of third-
party victims of motor vehicle accidents less beneficial than citizens would experience if the 
EU law was correctly applied. However, on closer inspection, it may even be more 
compelling to disapply the offending provisions within the RTA88 when compared with the 
MSA88 as in Factortame,
158
 had the Spanish fishermen complied with the criteria identified 
in that Act, access, and therefore the movement of goods and persons, could have been 
achieved. In respect of the RTA88, and to give just one example of s. 145 and the geographic 
scope of compulsory motor vehicle insurance (per Vnuk),
159
 it is actually not possible for an 
affected citizen to protect themselves against the actions of a negligent uninsured motorist for 
an accident occurring on private land. There are no comparable criteria within the RTA88 
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which, upon satisfaction, grant protection to the citizen. Citizens in the EU have the right to 
expect EU law to be applied in each Member State, and the MVID and the Court of Justice 
have clarified the issue regarding the geographic scope of compulsory motor vehicle 
insurance. That the RTA88 has not been amended since the ruling in 2014, the judiciary seem 
unwilling, even in recent cases, to understand or appreciate the significance and nuance 
within the reasoning of Vnuk,
160
 Andrade
161
 and Juliana,
162
 and subsequently citizens may 
lack confidence in whether the law will be applied correctly and whether they will have 
access to the protection afforded at the EU level, this may have tangible effect on free 
movement. Personal insurance cover will protect the individual against associated medical 
costs, but they are unlikely to cover the suite of losses that would have been available against 
an insured and identified driver, and which should have been available through the MIB as 
insurer of last resort in the event of no such cover being available. Yet the national law fails 
in this duty, the courts have frequently not applied EU law in any semblance of consistency 
with the provisions in the MVID, and the consequence is the exposure of risk to the 
individual third-party victim. Such a victim lacks the ability, that was even available to the 
Spanish fishermen, to facilitate free movement on terms comparable with citizens in other 
Member States. 
 
HS2 has extended the principle of disapplying an Act of Parliament in Factortame
163
 based 
on a Treaty Article and extended its reach to the disapplication on the basis of an EU 
Directive. Hence, even if the view is that motor vehicle insurance law is not a direct aspect of 
the free movement principles of the EU (which, in any respect, we believe they are) and a 
Treaty Article, the MVID, as a Directive, is not in any meaningful way (hierarchical as 
opposed to its content) to the EIA Directive. They both impose obligations on Member State 
to achieve the aims within and indeed, given that aspects of the MVID have been held to 
have direct effect, it could be even argued that it has a greater argument for requiring 
offending national law to be disapplied than the EIA.
164
 
 
In HS2,
165
 at para. 191, Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance refer to the source of the EIA for 
the subsequent adoption of the UK legislation. As the MVID began its life in 1972, albeit 
inspired by the UK RTA 1930, it has through iterations in [1983, 1990, 2000, 2005 and 2009] 
initially been the precursor for aspects of the RTA88, and much more comprehensively the 
UDA [1988, 1999 and 2015] and UtDA [1996, 2003 and 2017]. Thus, those provisions 
therein must be viewed “as subject to a pre-condition that the legislative process must have 
enabled the objectives pursued by the Directive to be achieved.”166 Further, at para. 206, Lord 
Neuberger and Lord Mance confirm  
 
Under the European Communities Act 1972, United Kingdom courts have also 
acknowledged that European law requires them to treat domestic statutes, whether 
passed before or after the 1972 Act, as invalid if and to the extent that they cannot be 
interpreted consistently with European law. 
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G. Concluding Remarks 
 
Compulsory motor insurance law is of great importance for the functioning of the 
Community and consequently on individuals’ movement (as drivers, passengers and victims). 
The protection within the Community must not be affected by or based on, for instance, 
where an accident takes place as far as it happened on Community land. In other words, 
victims shall not be disadvantaged as to their claim, depending upon in which State the 
accident occurred, rather they should be treated equally in terms of the levels of 
compensation provided as well as to the procedural rules applicable in national courts.
167
 
Directives were chosen as the legislative method to achieve such goals and they create the 
legal framework to guarantee that compensation is always available for victims of motor 
vehicle accidents by facilitating a claim directly against the responsible driver, their insurer 
(if applicable) or where impossible, from the relevant compensatory body. The MVID 
ensures that Member States have very little margin of discretion when it comes to derogating 
from these responsibilities, for example through the operation of contractual exclusion 
clauses. Nevertheless, and as far as the UK is concerned, the government and the judiciary 
(interpreted broadly) seem to reject the notion that the MVID can have a broad interpretation 
so as would mean that the UK failed to fulfil its duty to implement the MVIDs effectively. 
However, some of the blame for this state of affairs may be levelled at the EU itself as the 
Commission has failed to take any action in this respect to challenge UK national law (see for 
instance, Lord Clyde’s argument in Clarke v Kato).168 Yet, given the political dimension to 
the decisions of the Commission to seek infringement claims against Member States
169
 and 
its complete discretion in this function,
170
 it is possible to excuse its lack of action in this 
regard. 
 
The article has identified those aspects of UK motor vehicle insurance law which contravene 
the MVID and undermine the free movement principles of the EU. Also, through Factortame 
(No. 2),
171
 it is constitutionally permissible for the courts to disapply an Act of Parliament 
that breaches a fundamental aspect of EU law. Thoburn
172
 provides that “ordinary” Acts of 
Parliament cannot implicitly repeal a “constitutional” Act, and thus the ECA 1972 could not 
be deemed to have been altered by the later RTA88. In HS2,
173
 the dicta of the Supreme 
Court identify that a hierarchy exists between national constitutional Acts (which is not as 
relevant for the argument we present here but is an interesting area for development – 
perhaps in a post-Brexit UK with future trade deals and the basis on which they are 
concluded), but also that an EU Directive has the power, at least in theory, to require the 
changing (and possibly disapplication) of a national UK Act of Parliament.  
 
UK national law has led to a lesser level of protection for the victims of motor vehicle 
accidents than is required under EU law. It has and continues to create uncertainty for all 
parties as to their legal rights and obligations. Given the problems with meaningful action by 
the State to rectify the law (see for example Vnuk
174
 and the continued lack of instruction in 
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the statutory and extra-statutory laws relating to the compulsory motor vehicle insurance on 
private land), the most compelling way to provide this certainty and to ensure the fulfilment 
of the UK’s obligations under EU law is for those offending aspects of the RTA88, the UDA 
and the UtDA to be disapplied. 
